Equality Before the Law and the Protection of the Rights of Men and Boys in the European Union and Greece – A Legal and Policy Submission Concerning Sex Equality, Positive Action, Family Law, Paternity, Access to Public Funding and the Rights of Male Citizens
Από Γιάννη Ζαχαρόπουλο
Equality Before the Law and the Protection of the Rights of Men and Boys in the European Union and Greece
A Legal and Policy Submission Concerning Sex Equality, Positive Action, Family Law, Paternity, Access to Public Funding and the Rights of Male Citizens
I. INTRODUCTION
This submission calls for a serious examination by the institutions of the European Union and the competent authorities of the Hellenic Republic of the practical application of the principle of equality between women and men.
The fundamental proposition is straightforward:
Equality between women and men cannot be understood as the protection of one sex alone. It requires a legal and institutional framework in which the rights, dignity, autonomy and legitimate interests of both sexes are recognised and protected.
European Union law expressly prohibits discrimination on grounds of sex and requires the Union to promote equality between women and men. Article 8 TFEU provides that, in all its activities, the Union shall aim to eliminate inequalities and promote equality between men and women. Article 10 TFEU further requires the Union, in defining and implementing its policies and activities, to combat discrimination based on sex.
Similarly, Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union prohibits discrimination on grounds of sex, while Article 23 expressly provides that equality between women and men must be ensured in all areas, including employment, work and pay.
These provisions do not establish a hierarchy in which the interests of women automatically prevail over those of men.
They establish a principle of equality.
The purpose of this submission is therefore not to challenge legitimate measures designed to address genuine disadvantage experienced by women. Rather, it is to insist that such measures must remain consistent with the wider legal principle of equality, must have a legitimate and evidence-based objective, and must not become a permanent system in which male citizens are treated as inherently less deserving of protection, assistance or recognition.
II. THE CENTRAL LEGAL QUESTION
The central question is not whether positive measures for women are ever lawful.
European law clearly recognises that they may be.
The central question is:
At what point does a measure intended to promote substantive equality become an unjustified or disproportionate differential treatment of persons solely because they are men?
Article 23 of the Charter expressly permits specific advantages in favour of the under-represented sex. Likewise, Article 3 of Directive 2006/54/EC permits positive action intended to ensure full equality in practice between men and women in working life.
However, the existence of an authorisation for positive action cannot logically mean that every sex-exclusive measure is automatically lawful.
A sex-based measure must still be connected to a legitimate equality objective and must operate within the limits imposed by the broader principles of equality, proportionality, necessity and non-discrimination.
This distinction is particularly important where public resources are involved.
III. THE GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
The Greek Constitution itself contains a clear principle of equality between men and women.
Article 4(1) provides:
“All Greeks are equal before the law.”
Article 4(2) further provides:
“Greek men and women have equal rights and equal obligations.”
These provisions are fundamental constitutional guarantees.
At the same time, Article 116(2) provides that the adoption of positive measures for promoting equality between men and women does not constitute discrimination on grounds of sex and requires the State to take measures to eliminate inequalities actually existing, particularly to the detriment of women.
This provision should not, however, be interpreted as establishing a constitutional presumption that every difference of treatment favouring women is lawful irrespective of its factual basis, duration, scope or proportionality.
Article 116(2) must be read together with Article 4.
The constitutional architecture therefore contains two principles which must operate together:
- equal rights and obligations of men and women; and
- the possibility of targeted positive measures where genuinely necessary to eliminate existing inequalities.
The second principle cannot simply extinguish the first.
IV. POSITIVE ACTION MUST NOT BECOME PERMANENT SEX-BASED PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT
Positive action has a legitimate role in equality policy.
However, positive action is not synonymous with unlimited preferential treatment.
The legal justification for a measure directed exclusively at women should therefore be capable of answering at least the following questions:
1. What precise inequality is being addressed?
2. What evidence demonstrates that the inequality actually exists?
3. Why is a sex-exclusive measure necessary?
4. Why would a gender-neutral measure be insufficient?
5. Is the measure proportionate to the identified disadvantage?
6. Is the measure periodically reviewed?
7. What happens when the factual inequality no longer exists?
These questions become particularly important when programmes are financed through public funds, including European Structural and Investment Funds.
A programme cannot be justified merely by invoking the abstract concept of “gender equality”.
The relevant question is whether the particular sex-based exclusion is objectively connected to a demonstrable equality objective.
V. EUROPEAN FUNDING AND GENDER-RESTRICTED PROGRAMMES
The European legal framework expressly recognises equality and anti-discrimination as principles relevant to Union policies.
Directive 2006/54/EC establishes equal treatment between men and women in employment and occupation and expressly prohibits direct and indirect discrimination on grounds of sex within its scope. At the same time, Article 3 permits positive action for full equality in practice.
Similarly, Directive 2010/41/EU establishes the principle of equal treatment between men and women engaged in self-employed activities, while permitting positive action, including measures promoting women’s entrepreneurship.
The legal issue is therefore not whether women-specific entrepreneurship initiatives are categorically prohibited.
They are not.
The issue is whether the continuing use of sex-exclusive access criteria is supported by a sufficiently concrete equality rationale and whether equivalent attention is given to demonstrable disadvantages experienced by men.
This is particularly important where European and national taxpayers’ money is being distributed.
A programme financed by public resources should not treat male citizens as a permanently privileged category simply because they are male, nor should it treat female applicants as automatically disadvantaged without a current evidence base.
The same principle should apply irrespective of the sex of the beneficiary.
VI. THE RIGHTS OF MEN UNDER THE EU CHARTER
The Charter does not contain a separate chapter entitled “rights of men”.
This is not necessary.
Men are beneficiaries of the same fundamental rights guaranteed to every person.
Article 21 prohibits discrimination based on sex.
Article 23 establishes equality between women and men.
Article 47 guarantees an effective remedy and a fair trial where rights guaranteed by Union law are violated.
Article 24 protects children’s rights and expressly recognises that every child has the right to maintain regular personal relations and direct contact with both parents unless contrary to the child’s interests.
Consequently, the rights of men and boys should not be treated as an ideological exception to European equality law.
They are part of it.
VII. FATHERHOOD, PATERNITY AND THE RIGHT TO PERSONAL IDENTITY
One of the most serious issues requiring examination concerns legal paternity.
The question of biological parenthood is not merely an economic question.
It can concern:
- personal identity;
- family life;
- genetic identity;
- psychological integrity;
- legal parenthood;
- inheritance;
- maintenance obligations;
- parental responsibilities;
- the relationship between a father and his child.
The European human-rights framework recognises the importance of a person’s ability to establish or clarify biological parentage.
The European Court of Human Rights’ Article 8 case-law recognises that questions concerning biological parentage can fall within the protection of private life. The Court’s current Article 8 guide specifically addresses situations in which putative biological fathers seek to challenge established paternity and emphasises the need for domestic safeguards capable of examining the competing interests involved.
Moreover, recent CJEU jurisprudence has expressly recognised that the right to identity includes the right to know and have recognised one’s parentage, while stressing that such interests must be balanced against competing rights and public interests.
Accordingly, the interests of the putative biological father cannot simply be dismissed as secondary or irrelevant.
VIII. THE GREEK PATERNITY FRAMEWORK
Greek law currently provides a specific legal framework for challenging presumed paternity.
Article 1470 of the Greek Civil Code provides, among other things, that for the mother’s husband, the challenge is excluded after one year from the time he learns of the birth and the circumstances indicating that conception did not result from him and, in any event, after five years from the birth.
This framework serves legitimate objectives, including legal certainty and the protection of family relationships.
Nevertheless, the existence of a legitimate objective does not eliminate the need for proportionality.
A legal system must confront the difficult question of whether the interests of legal certainty can justify permanently maintaining a legal parent-child relationship where compelling biological evidence subsequently establishes that the presumed father is not the biological father.
The issue deserves examination rather than dismissal.
IX. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN BIOLOGICAL TRUTH AND LEGAL PARENTHOOD
The law may legitimately recognise that biological parenthood and legal parenthood are not always identical.
However, the existence of legal parenthood should not mean that biological reality becomes legally irrelevant.
A balanced legal framework should therefore seek to protect simultaneously:
- the child’s identity;
- the child’s stability;
- the child’s relationship with both parents;
- the biological father’s legitimate interests;
- the legal father’s legitimate interests;
- the mother’s rights;
- legal certainty;
- the integrity of the judicial process.
The appropriate solution is not necessarily unrestricted private DNA testing of children.
The more precise question is whether the legal system provides an effective, timely and proportionate mechanism through which a man can establish whether he is the biological father and, where appropriate, challenge a legal status that does not correspond to biological reality.
X. THE ASYMMETRY BETWEEN MATERNAL AND PATERNAL AUTONOMY
A further issue requiring serious legal examination concerns the fundamentally different biological positions of men and women in relation to pregnancy.
A woman carries the pregnancy within her own body and therefore possesses bodily-autonomy interests that cannot simply be transferred to another person.
At the same time, the man cannot exercise an equivalent bodily veto over pregnancy.
This biological asymmetry is a factual reality.
However, the existence of that asymmetry should not automatically justify unlimited asymmetry in every subsequent legal consequence.
Once a child is born, questions concerning:
- legal parenthood;
- genetic identity;
- parental responsibility;
- access to the child;
- financial obligations;
- family life;
must be assessed under principles capable of recognising the interests of both parents and, above all, the rights and welfare of the child.
The European Union Charter itself recognises the child’s right to maintain personal relationships and direct contact with both parents, subject to the child’s interests.
XI. FATHERS ARE NOT MERELY FINANCIAL PROVIDERS
European family policy has increasingly recognised the importance of fathers’ participation in family life.
Directive (EU) 2019/1158, concerning work-life balance for parents and carers, introduced an EU-level right to paternity leave of at least ten working days for fathers, reflecting the objective of facilitating the early creation of a bond between fathers and children and encouraging a more equal sharing of caring responsibilities.
This demonstrates an important principle:
European policy does not regard fathers merely as economic providers.
Fathers are parents.
Accordingly, public policy concerning children should not be constructed on assumptions that maternal involvement is inherently more valuable or that paternal involvement is inherently secondary.
XII. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE NEED FOR PROTECTION OF MALE VICTIMS
A further area requiring clarification concerns violence policy.
Directive (EU) 2024/1385 concerns combating violence against women and domestic violence.
Crucially, while the Directive contains specific provisions addressing violence against women, its provisions concerning victims of domestic violence apply to victims regardless of gender. The Directive expressly defines a “victim” as any person, regardless of gender, who has suffered harm caused by violence against women or domestic violence.
This distinction must be preserved in national implementation.
A male victim of domestic violence must not become invisible merely because the principal policy narrative is focused on violence against women.
A genuinely rights-based approach requires protection based upon victimisation and need, while allowing targeted measures where objective evidence demonstrates a specific vulnerability.
XIII. THE PROBLEM OF GENDER STEREOTYPES AGAINST MEN
European and human-rights law increasingly recognises that sex discrimination can also arise through stereotypes concerning men.
The European Court of Human Rights’ case-law concerning parental leave for men is particularly important.
In Konstantin Markin v. Russia, the Grand Chamber found discriminatory the exclusion of military servicemen from parental leave and considered that the measure perpetuated gender stereotypes.
The principle is broader than parental leave.
A legal system should not assume that:
- men are inherently strong;
- men do not require psychological support;
- fathers are secondary parents;
- male victims are less credible;
- boys are automatically advantaged;
- men do not experience sex-based disadvantage;
- male-specific problems are merely individual failures.
Such assumptions can themselves become barriers to substantive equality.
XIV. EQUALITY REQUIRES ATTENTION TO DISADVANTAGE WHEREVER IT EXISTS
A coherent equality policy must therefore recognise that disadvantages can affect both sexes.
The appropriate methodology is not:
“Women are disadvantaged; therefore women require protection.”
Nor is it:
“Men are disadvantaged; therefore women should lose protection.”
The appropriate methodology is:
Identify the actual disadvantage, identify the affected population, establish the cause, assess the appropriate remedy, and apply that remedy proportionately without unnecessary discrimination.
This is the only approach compatible with genuine equality.
XV. REQUEST FOR AN EU-WIDE REVIEW
The European institutions are therefore respectfully invited to consider a structured review of the implementation of sex equality policies, with particular attention to:
A. Male victims of domestic violence
Whether national systems provide effective protection, reporting mechanisms, shelters, counselling, legal assistance and support services accessible to male victims.
B. Fathers and family life
Whether fathers enjoy effective and practical opportunities to maintain meaningful relationships with their children following separation or divorce.
C. Paternity and biological identity
Whether national systems provide timely, accessible and proportionate mechanisms for men to establish or challenge biological parenthood.
D. Sex-exclusive public funding
Whether programmes financed wholly or partly by EU funds exclude men without a sufficiently specific and current evidence-based justification.
E. Boys’ educational outcomes
Whether education policy adequately recognises disadvantages affecting boys, where such disadvantages are demonstrated by evidence.
F. Men’s mental health
Whether policy frameworks sufficiently recognise male-specific barriers to accessing psychological and mental-health support.
G. Male-specific health
Whether public-health strategies adequately address health conditions and mortality patterns disproportionately affecting men.
H. Institutional representation
Whether equality institutions systematically incorporate the legitimate interests and measurable disadvantages of men and boys into their policy assessments.
XVI. REQUEST FOR A GENDER-EQUALITY IMPACT TEST
It is proposed that the European Commission and Member States introduce a Gender Equality Impact Assessment for significant sex-specific legislation, funding programmes and policy measures.
Such an assessment should examine both sexes.
Before adopting a sex-specific measure, the responsible authority should publish:
- the evidence establishing the relevant inequality;
- the precise objective;
- the reason for selecting one sex;
- the consideration given to gender-neutral alternatives;
- the proportionality assessment;
- the expected duration;
- measurable success indicators;
- a review date;
- evidence concerning possible adverse effects on the excluded sex.
This would transform gender equality from a predominantly one-directional policy model into a genuinely bilateral equality framework.
XVII. CONCLUSION
The European project is founded upon human dignity, equality, fundamental rights and the rule of law.
Those principles cannot depend upon the sex of the person invoking them.
The protection of women from discrimination is indispensable.
The protection of men from discrimination is equally a component of the principle of equality.
Supporting women and recognising women’s historical or contemporary disadvantages does not require ignoring men and boys.
Protecting children does not require disregarding fathers.
Recognising bodily autonomy does not require treating male identity and parenthood as legally irrelevant.
Positive action does not mean permanent exclusion.
And gender equality cannot credibly mean equality only when the beneficiary is female.
The European Union and its Member States should therefore move toward a genuinely sex-neutral conception of fundamental rights: one which permits targeted measures where objective evidence establishes a particular disadvantage, but which also recognises and remedies disadvantages affecting men and boys.
The ultimate test of equality is not whether a policy was introduced with good intentions.
It is whether the legal system treats every individual as a person of equal dignity and whether any differential treatment can withstand scrutiny under the principles of legality, legitimate aim, necessity and proportionality.
That standard must apply to men as well as women.
Equality must be universal, or it ceases to be equality.
APPENDIX I
THE RIGHTS OF MEN AND BOYS UNDER EUROPEAN AND GREEK LAW
1. Right to equality before the law
Men are protected by the general principle of equality and by the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sex.
EU Charter, Article 21: discrimination based on sex is prohibited.
EU Charter, Article 23: equality between women and men must be ensured in all areas.
Greek Constitution, Article 4(1): all Greeks are equal before the law.
Greek Constitution, Article 4(2): Greek men and women have equal rights and equal obligations.
2. Right to protection against sex discrimination
A man cannot lawfully be regarded as outside the scope of equality protection merely because the policy objective is described as “gender equality”.
Article 10 TFEU expressly requires the Union to combat discrimination based on sex.
3. Right to equal treatment in employment
Directive 2006/54/EC establishes equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in employment and occupation and addresses access to employment, vocational training, working conditions, pay and occupational social security.
4. Right to equal treatment as a self-employed person
Directive 2010/41/EU establishes equal treatment between men and women engaged in self-employed activity and prohibits direct and indirect discrimination within its scope.
5. Protection against unjustified sex-exclusive economic measures
EU law permits positive action.
It does not establish a general principle that every economic programme may automatically exclude men.
Positive action should therefore be connected to the objective of achieving substantive equality.
The legality of a specific programme depends upon its legal basis, scope, factual justification and proportionality.
6. Right to family life
Men are protected by the right to respect for private and family life under European human-rights law.
This includes legitimate interests concerning biological identity and parenthood.
The ECHR has specifically recognised the importance of effective safeguards for putative biological fathers seeking to challenge established paternity.
7. Right to know one’s biological parentage
Questions concerning biological parentage can fall within the protection of private life.
Recent CJEU jurisprudence expressly recognises that the right to identity includes the right to know and have one’s parentage recognised.
This principle is relevant not only to children seeking their origins but also to the legitimate interests of persons claiming or contesting biological parenthood.
8. Rights of fathers
EU law expressly recognises fathers as participants in family life.
Directive 2019/1158 establishes a minimum EU right to paternity leave and seeks to facilitate the early bond between fathers and children.
9. Child’s relationship with both parents
Article 24(3) of the EU Charter provides that every child has the right to maintain regular personal relationships and direct contact with both parents unless contrary to the child’s interests.
This provision is important when assessing family-law systems affecting fathers.
10. Right to effective judicial protection
Article 47 of the EU Charter guarantees an effective remedy and a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time before an independent and impartial tribunal where rights guaranteed by Union law are violated.
This principle is particularly relevant where a person must resort to lengthy judicial proceedings to establish or protect a fundamental family-law interest.
11. Protection of male victims of domestic violence
Directive (EU) 2024/1385 expressly provides that its provisions concerning victims of domestic violence apply regardless of gender.
The Directive defines “victim” as any person, regardless of gender, who has suffered harm directly caused by violence against women or domestic violence.
National implementation should therefore ensure that male victims are not excluded in practice from effective protection and support.
12. Protection against harmful gender stereotypes
The European Court of Human Rights has recognised that discriminatory assumptions concerning men’s parental role can constitute sex discrimination.
In Konstantin Markin v. Russia, the exclusion of a male serviceman from parental leave was found discriminatory and linked to the perpetuation of gender stereotypes.
13. Greek constitutional positive action
Article 116(2) of the Greek Constitution permits positive measures promoting equality between men and women and directs the State to eliminate existing inequalities, particularly those detrimental to women.
However, Article 116(2) should be read together with Article 4’s guarantee of equal rights and obligations.
It should not be understood as removing men from constitutional equality protection.
14. Paternity challenge in Greek law
Article 1470 of the Greek Civil Code establishes limitation/exclusion periods for actions challenging paternity, including a one-year period linked to knowledge of the birth and relevant circumstances and, for the mother’s husband, an absolute five-year period from birth under the provision cited.
The existence and proportionality of such limitations should remain open to examination where subsequent biological evidence conflicts with established legal parenthood.
15. The principle that should govern future policy
The appropriate principle should be:
Gender equality must protect individuals, not categories of people presumed to be permanently privileged or permanently disadvantaged.
Where evidence establishes a sex-specific disadvantage, targeted action may be justified.
Where evidence establishes a disadvantage affecting men or boys, targeted action should likewise be capable of being justified.
APPENDIX II
PROPOSED EUROPEAN MALE EQUALITY FRAMEWORK
A comprehensive European equality framework should include measurable indicators concerning:
- male educational attainment and school completion;
- boys’ academic performance;
- male suicide and mental-health outcomes;
- male homelessness;
- male occupational fatalities;
- men’s access to healthcare;
- prostate and testicular cancer;
- fathers’ access to children following separation;
- domestic violence against male victims;
- male victims of sexual violence;
- paternity and genetic identity;
- parental leave and paternal participation;
- sex discrimination against male applicants;
- male access to public funding and entrepreneurship programmes;
- male representation in professions where men are significantly under-represented;
- gender stereotypes affecting boys and men.
The objective should not be to create a competing hierarchy of suffering.
The objective should be to ensure that no person’s sex determines whether his or her legitimate disadvantage is considered worthy of public attention.
APPENDIX III
PROPOSED LEGAL AND POLICY REQUESTS
The competent EU and Greek authorities are respectfully requested to:
- Review sex-exclusive public funding schemes for compliance with applicable equality and anti-discrimination principles.
- Require evidence-based justification for sex-specific restrictions in programmes financed through EU funds.
- Introduce systematic gender-impact assessments covering both men and women.
- Assess whether national family-law procedures provide effective and timely mechanisms for establishing or challenging biological parenthood.
- Examine whether existing paternity limitation periods achieve a proportionate balance between legal certainty, the child’s interests and the legitimate interests of the presumed father.
- Ensure that male victims of domestic violence have effective access to protection, shelters, counselling, legal assistance and other support services.
- Ensure that fathers are treated as full parents rather than merely financial providers.
- Collect and publish sex-disaggregated data concerning disadvantages affecting men and boys.
- Ensure that equality strategies explicitly recognise disadvantages affecting both sexes.
- Review policies that may unintentionally reinforce gender stereotypes concerning male emotional resilience, fatherhood, caregiving or victimhood.
- Establish a regular review mechanism to determine whether sex-specific positive-action measures remain necessary and proportionate.
- Ensure that European gender-equality policy is interpreted consistently with the fundamental principle that men and women possess equal human dignity and equal entitlement to protection under the law.
APPENDIX IV
PRIMARY LEGAL SOURCES AND AUTHORITIES
The Rights of Men and Fathers under European Union, European Human Rights and Greek Law
A. EUROPEAN UNION PRIMARY LAW
1. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union — Article 8
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Article 8
Article 8 provides:
“In all its activities, the Union shall aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality, between men and women.”
This is a foundational provision for the proposition that EU gender-equality policy is directed toward equality between men and women, rather than toward the protection of women exclusively.
Official source — EUR-Lex:
TFEU, Article 8 — Official EUR-Lex text
2. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union — Article 10
TFEU, Article 10
Article 10 requires the Union, when defining and implementing its policies and activities, to combat discrimination based on sex.
This provision is particularly relevant when examining whether EU policies, funding mechanisms or legislative measures produce differential treatment on the basis of sex.
Official source — EUR-Lex:
TFEU, Articles 8–10 — Official consolidated text
B. CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
3. Article 20 — Equality before the law
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 20
“Everyone is equal before the law.”
This is the general equality guarantee upon which the more specific prohibition of sex discrimination operates.
Official source — EUR-Lex:
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights — Articles 20–24
4. Article 21 — Non-discrimination
Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 21(1)
Article 21 expressly prohibits discrimination on grounds including sex.
This provision is central to the proposition that men are themselves beneficiaries of the EU’s fundamental-rights protection against sex discrimination.
It is therefore legally incorrect to conceptualise sex discrimination as a protection applicable only when women are adversely affected.
Official source — EUR-Lex:
Charter Article 21 — Non-discrimination
5. Article 23 — Equality between women and men
Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 23
Article 23 provides:
“Equality between women and men must be ensured in all areas, including employment, work and pay.”
It additionally recognises that specific advantages may be adopted in favour of the under-represented sex.
This provision is important because it establishes both sides of the legal framework:
- equality between women and men is the governing principle; and
- positive-action measures may constitute a legitimate exception where their legal requirements are satisfied.
Consequently, Article 23 should not be interpreted as creating a general exemption from equality whenever a measure benefits women.
Official source — EUR-Lex:
Charter Article 23 — Equality between women and men
6. Article 24 — Rights of the child and relationship with both parents
Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 24(3)
Article 24 provides that every child has the right to maintain regular personal relationships and direct contact with both parents, unless contrary to the child’s interests.
This provision is directly relevant to fathers’ rights because paternal involvement is expressly recognised within the EU fundamental-rights framework through the child’s relationship with both parents.
Official source — EUR-Lex:
EU Charter — Article 24, Rights of the Child
7. Article 47 — Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial
Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 47
Article 47 guarantees an effective remedy before a tribunal and a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time.
This is particularly relevant to family-law and paternity disputes where the practical exercise of a person’s rights depends upon access to an effective judicial mechanism.
Official source — EUR-Lex:
Charter Article 47 — Effective remedy and fair trial
C. EUROPEAN UNION DIRECTIVES
8. Directive 2006/54/EC — Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation
Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
This Directive establishes the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in employment and occupation.
Article 3 expressly addresses positive action and permits measures intended to ensure full equality in practice between men and women in working life.
This is an important legal authority for distinguishing between:
legitimate positive action
and
an assumption that sex-based preferential treatment is automatically lawful.
Official source — EUR-Lex:
Directive 2006/54/EC — Equal treatment in employment and occupation
9. Directive 2010/41/EU — Equal Treatment of Self-Employed Men and Women
Directive 2010/41/EU
The Directive establishes the principle of equal treatment between men and women engaged in self-employed activity.
Its framework prohibits discrimination on grounds of sex while allowing positive-action measures in appropriate circumstances.
The current consolidated EUR-Lex record confirms that the Directive remains in force and has been amended, including by Directive (EU) 2024/1500.
Official source — EUR-Lex:
Directive 2010/41/EU — current consolidated text
10. Directive (EU) 2019/1158 — Work-Life Balance for Parents and Carers
This Directive is particularly significant for the rights of fathers.
Article 4 requires Member States to ensure that fathers have a right to 10 working days of paternity leave on the occasion of the birth of their child.
Article 5 establishes an individual right to parental leave for each worker and requires that each parent be able to exercise the right effectively and on an equal basis.
This is a direct example of EU law recognising fathers as autonomous parents and not merely as economic providers.
Official source — EUR-Lex:
Directive (EU) 2019/1158 — Work-life balance and paternity leave
11. Directive (EU) 2024/1385 — Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence
This Directive is especially important when discussing male victims.
Article 2(c) defines a victim as:
“any person, regardless of their gender”
who has suffered harm directly caused by violence against women or domestic violence.
Furthermore, Chapters 3–7 apply to victims of offences of domestic violence regardless of gender.
Consequently, the EU legal framework does not lawfully permit male victims of domestic violence simply to disappear from the protection framework.
Official source — EUR-Lex:
Directive (EU) 2024/1385 — official EUR-Lex text
D. EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
12. Article 8 — Right to respect for private and family life
European Convention on Human Rights, Article 8
Article 8 protects:
- private life;
- family life;
- personal identity;
- physical and psychological integrity;
- family relationships.
This provision is particularly significant for fathers because the European Court of Human Rights has treated paternity proceedings as falling within the scope of Article 8.
It therefore provides an important legal foundation for examining the interests of a man whose legal status as a father conflicts with biological evidence.
13. Article 14 — Prohibition of discrimination
Article 14 requires the enjoyment of Convention rights to be secured without discrimination, including discrimination based on sex.
The provision operates in conjunction with substantive Convention rights such as Article 8.
Accordingly, where a father’s private or family life is affected by a legal rule, differential treatment based on sex may engage Article 14 together with Article 8.
E. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS — PATERNITY AND FATHERHOOD
14. Mizzi v. Malta
Mizzi v. Malta, Application no. 26111/02, judgment of 12 January 2006
This is one of the most directly relevant authorities for the rights of a presumed father.
The applicant sought to challenge legal paternity after scientific evidence indicated that he was not the biological father.
The Court examined the case under Articles 6, 8 and 14 of the Convention.
The case is highly relevant because the Court found that the rigid application of the domestic limitation framework had violated the applicant’s Convention rights.
The Court considered that the inability to disclaim paternity in the circumstances was not proportionate to the legitimate aims relied upon and found a violation of Article 8.
It also found a violation of Article 6 concerning access to a court and a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with the Convention rights.
This authority is particularly valuable because it demonstrates that the legitimate interests of a presumed father in challenging biological paternity are capable of receiving independent protection under the Convention.
Official ECHR case material / case references:
European Court of Human Rights — Malta case-law material
15. Rasmussen v. Denmark
Rasmussen v. Denmark, Application no. 8777/79, judgment of 28 November 1984
The Court recognised that paternity proceedings fall within the scope of Article 8.
The case forms part of the Strasbourg jurisprudence establishing that legal questions concerning parentage and family status can engage the right to respect for private and family life.
It is therefore an important foundation for subsequent paternity jurisprudence.
16. Mikulić v. Croatia
Mikulić v. Croatia, Application no. 53176/99, judgment of 7 February 2002
Mikulić concerned proceedings intended to establish biological paternity.
The Court recognised the importance of establishing personal identity and biological parentage under Article 8.
Although the applicant in that case was a child seeking to establish paternity, the judgment is important for the broader legal principle that biological parentage and personal identity fall within the sphere of private life protected by Article 8.
This principle is relevant to fathers as well as children where the legal relationship of parenthood is disputed.
17. Rizzo and Others v. Malta
The Strasbourg jurisprudence concerning Malta has continued to address the interaction between legal paternity, biological evidence and Article 8.
The ECHR’s own country case-law material identifies cases concerning attempts to repudiate paternity and Article 8.
Official ECHR material:
ECHR — Malta case-law and Article 8 materials
F. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS — FATHERS AND SEX DISCRIMINATION
18. Konstantin Markin v. Russia
Konstantin Markin v. Russia, Application no. 30078/06
The case concerned a male military serviceman who was denied parental leave available to female military personnel.
The applicant invoked Article 8 and Article 14.
The case is a significant authority against the assumption that differential treatment affecting men is necessarily justified merely because it concerns family or parental policy.
It demonstrates that men may themselves be victims of sex discrimination where legislation is based upon gender stereotypes concerning men’s parental role.
Case information:
Konstantin Markin v. Russia — case information
G. GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
19. Constitution of Greece — Article 4(1)
Article 4(1) provides:
“All Greeks are equal before the law.”
This is the general constitutional equality guarantee.
Official source — Hellenic Parliament:
Constitution of Greece — Article 4
20. Constitution of Greece — Article 4(2)
Article 4(2) provides:
“Greek men and women have equal rights and equal obligations.”
This is the central constitutional provision supporting the proposition that equality is owed to both sexes.
Official source — Hellenic Parliament:
Constitution of Greece — Article 4
21. Constitution of Greece — Article 116(2)
Article 116(2) provides:
“The taking of positive measures to promote equality between men and women does not constitute gender discrimination.”
It further provides that the State shall take measures to eliminate inequalities existing in practice, particularly those affecting women.
The provision is therefore the constitutional basis for positive action.
However, it must be read together with Article 4(2), which expressly guarantees equal rights and obligations to Greek men and women.
Official source — Hellenic Parliament:
Constitution of Greece — Article 116
H. GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
22. Article 4 and Article 116 must be read together
The constitutional structure is important.
Article 4(2) establishes:
equal rights and equal obligations.
Article 116(2) permits:
positive measures intended to promote substantive equality.
Therefore, Article 116(2) should not be treated as a constitutional declaration that every sex-specific measure favouring women is automatically immune from legal scrutiny.
The Greek constitutional text itself describes Article 116(2) as a measure for promoting equality between men and women.
This supports the proposition that positive action is an instrument of equality rather than a replacement for equality.
The official constitutional text confirms both provisions.
I. GREEK PATERNITY LAW
23. Greek Civil Code — Article 1470
Article 1470 of the Greek Civil Code establishes limitation rules concerning the action challenging paternity, including specific periods applicable to the mother’s husband.
This provision is relevant to the examination of whether Greek law provides an effective and proportionate mechanism for a presumed father to challenge legal paternity where biological evidence indicates that he is not the biological father.
The provision should therefore be examined in conjunction with:
- Article 8 ECHR;
- Article 6 ECHR;
- Article 14 ECHR;
- relevant Strasbourg case-law;
- the child’s best interests;
- legal certainty;
- biological identity;
- the father’s private and family life.
J. PRINCIPAL LEGAL PROPOSITION
The combined effect of these authorities supports the following legal proposition:
Men and fathers are not beneficiaries of a secondary or derivative category of rights. They are holders of fundamental rights in their own capacity.
Their protection arises from general principles of:
- equality before the law;
- non-discrimination;
- respect for private life;
- respect for family life;
- personal identity;
- effective judicial protection;
- parental participation;
- protection against sex stereotypes;
- and the best interests and rights of children.
The legal argument should therefore not be framed as:
“Women have rights, therefore men should receive equivalent rights.”
The stronger formulation is:
Men and fathers already possess fundamental rights under European and national law. The legal question is whether those rights are being effectively recognised, protected and made practically enforceable.
K. LEGAL SOURCES TO BE USED AS THE PRIMARY AUTHORITIES
For the purposes of the main submission, the following hierarchy of authorities is recommended:
Primary EU law
- TFEU Article 8 — equality between men and women.
- TFEU Article 10 — combating discrimination based on sex.
- EU Charter Article 20 — equality before the law.
- EU Charter Article 21 — prohibition of sex discrimination.
- EU Charter Article 23 — equality between women and men.
- EU Charter Article 24 — rights of the child and contact with both parents.
- EU Charter Article 47 — effective judicial protection.
EU secondary law
- Directive 2006/54/EC — equal treatment in employment and occupation.
- Directive 2010/41/EU — equal treatment of self-employed men and women.
- Directive (EU) 2019/1158 — work-life balance and fathers’ parental rights.
- Directive (EU) 2024/1385 — domestic violence protection regardless of victim’s gender.
European human-rights law
- ECHR Article 8 — private and family life.
- ECHR Article 14 — non-discrimination.
- Mizzi v. Malta — paternity, Article 8, Article 6 and Article 14.
- Mikulić v. Croatia — paternity, personal identity and Article 8.
- Rasmussen v. Denmark — paternity proceedings and Article 8.
- Konstantin Markin v. Russia — fathers, parental leave and sex discrimination.
Greek constitutional law
- Greek Constitution Article 4(1) — equality before the law.
- Greek Constitution Article 4(2) — equal rights and obligations of men and women.
- Greek Constitution Article 116(2) — positive action and elimination of inequalities.
Greek family law
- Greek Civil Code Article 1470 — limitation rules concerning challenges to paternity.
L. IMPORTANT LEGAL QUALIFICATION
The existence of these provisions does not, by itself, establish that a particular Greek or EU measure is unlawful.
The legal analysis must distinguish between:
- a general principle of equality;
- a lawful positive-action measure;
- a directly discriminatory measure;
- an indirectly discriminatory measure;
- a measure falling outside the scope of a particular EU instrument;
- a measure justified by a legitimate objective;
- and a measure whose differential treatment may fail proportionality or other applicable legal requirements.
Accordingly, each specific allegation should be tied to the applicable legal instrument and, where possible, to the exact national provision, funding programme, administrative decision or Directive being challenged.
This distinction is essential if the submission is intended to be presented to the European Commission, European Parliament, European Ombudsman, Council of Europe, European Court of Human Rights, or Greek public authorities.
CORE AUTHORITIES
European Union:
EUR-Lex — Treaties and EU legislation
European Court of Human Rights:
HUDOC — ECHR case-law database
Council of Europe / ECHR:
European Court of Human Rights
Hellenic Parliament — Constitution:
Constitution of Greece — Hellenic Parliament
NOTE ON THE PURPOSE OF THIS APPENDIX
This Appendix is intended to function as the legal authority section accompanying the principal submission.
Its purpose is not to assert that every provision listed creates an autonomous “right of men” in those exact words.


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